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Some Observations on China’s 
Economic Transformation
Vasant A. Sukhatme
In recent months I have made several trips to the Wal-Mart store 
near my home, to purchase a smoke detector for the upstairs hallway, 
an electric iron, a no-frills DVD player, and a pump sprayer for use in 
our flower garden. Every item I purchased was made in China. The 
range of products coming out of China in recent years leads even a 
casual observer to sit up and take notice of the country where such 
products are made and understand the story behind its remarkable 
transformation from a poor, closed economy to a rising market-based 
economy over the past three decades. My participation in Macalester’s 
recent Faculty Development International Seminar provided me with 
a great opportunity to visit China and increase my appreciation of its 
economic transformation.1 This essay reports my understanding of the 
Chinese story. I have long taught and researched issues in economic 
development and tried to understand why some countries grow faster 
than others over long periods of time. My visit to China reinforced my 
concern and interest in this subject.
In an earlier era, Japan’s economic rise after the Second World War 
was characterized as an economic miracle. Subsequently, in the 1970s 
and 1980s, the growth record of South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and 
Hong Kong came to be hailed as economic miracles. But the perfor-
mance of all of these countries pales in comparison to China’s growth 
record after its economic reforms of 1978. China is the economic mira-
cle par excellence. China’s economy grew at a more rapid rate for more 
years than any other country in all of recorded history. By all the usual 
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measures—real per capita income, life expectancy at birth, infant mor-
tality rate, adult literacy rate, or the Human Development Index—the 
Chinese people are significantly better off than they were just three 
decades ago. Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong 
all grew by becoming more fully integrated into the world economy 
and by changing the institutional framework under which economic 
agents, including those in various levels of government, undertook 
decisions. So too has been the story of China.
The People’s Republic of China was established in 1949 and the Com-
munist Party moved very quickly to model its development strategy 
on the Soviet model (plan). By the mid-1950s, the public sector owned 
all the assets in the country; central planning and the accompanying 
price rigidities and allocation mechanisms were well in place; and the 
Communist Party had assumed complete control over all economic 
activity. State-owned enterprises were required to meet output and 
delivery goals set by the central authorities, and prices ceased to play 
any role in allocating resources among alternative uses. State invest-
ment was directed overwhelmingly to the industrial sector though, to 
be sure, the government did invest in inputs for agriculture, such as 
fertilizer and agricultural machinery. The development strategy was 
focused on developing heavy industry to achieve self-reliant growth 
and was inward looking; it was also divorced from the realities of a 
price system and involved extensive administrative controls on foreign 
exchange and credit. The outcome was inevitable and entirely predict-
able. In the mid-1970s, China remained very poor and by the end of 
the turbulent period of the Cultural Revolution (in the mid-1970s) it 
was clear to many within China that the country had fallen substan-
tially behind its neighbors South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and, of 
course, Japan, who had all made rapid progress by greater reliance 
on the price system and the world economy. The first tentative steps 
toward economic reforms took place in 1978 and, since then, remark-
able change has occurred that has transformed the lives of many hun-
dreds of millions of its people.
The rest of this essay is organized as follows. Section I provides 
a broad overview of the transition process, along with the key dates 
when significant changes occurred. In Section II, I draw lessons from 
the Chinese experiment, the most important of which is that China 
was able to effect momentous change relatively smoothly and without 
much opposition from interest groups impacted by policy changes. 
Section III highlights some important challenges that face China.
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I. Phases of Reform
It has long been said that much of economics can be put in a simple 
sentence: people respond to incentives. Under the right reward struc-
ture, people and even government entities can work miracles. But the 
connection between economic policies and economic growth is not 
simple or direct; some kinds of economic policies can be conducive to 
economic growth while others can be harmful to it. There are many 
examples of countries in all parts of the world where bad policies have 
caused economic ruin. Bad policies create distortions that stand in the 
way of efficient resource use. These distortions mainly affect the level 
of economic activity and the resulting output, not its rate of growth over 
time. The rate of growth is affected as the economy moves from one 
level of activity to another. Policy changes do not generally influence 
rates of growth. That is not to say that the effects of policy reforms are 
not important; indeed, a series of policy reforms will add up to enor-
mous consequences. This is precisely what happened in China, where 
the policymakers were willing to change the economic institutions in 
place for decades (for example, collectives in agriculture), and enabled 
the establishment of special economic zones in the southern and coastal 
areas, financed in large part by foreign direct investments.
In a broad sense, China’s economic transformation has followed 
a “dual-track” system, which may well be the main reason behind 
its huge success. The dual-track system works as follows: (a) under 
the “plan track,” agricultural communes or households or industrial 
firms are required to deliver specified amounts of output to govern-
ment authorities (as established in the existing plans) at predetermined 
prices, and (b) under the “market track,” these economic agents can 
sell their output on the open market at whatever price the output 
will fetch once they have satisfied their plan obligations. Further, under 
the dual-track approach, economic agents receive input allocations 
from plan authorities at pre-set input prices but may purchase addi-
tional amounts on the open market. Researchers have shown that as 
long as the pre-existing plan is feasible and continues to be enforced, 
the dual-track approach to market liberalization is efficient and Pareto-
improving.2
The intuition behind this is straightforward: the introduction of a 
market track provides an opportunity for economic agents to become 
better off, and the maintenance of the plan track protects the status-
quo rents under the existing plan. The maintenance of the plan track 
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provides stability and predictability while the market track provides 
incentives at the margin. This is also the reason why opposition to the 
dual-track approach is likely to be minimal at the start of reforms, and 
also why, once reforms have begun, there is likely to be minimal pres-
sure to reverse the reforms. A dual-track system was established not 
only in agriculture, but also in industry and in the fiscal system.
Economic reform began with the Third Plenum of the 11th Commu-
nist Party Congress in December 1978 and has gone through several 
phases since then. The first reform was in agriculture in 1978. This was 
the first application of the dual-track approach and it signaled a signif-
icant reorientation in the strategy of economic development. The key 
administrative unit in Chinese collectivized agriculture was the com-
mune. The central plan authority allocated inputs to each commune 
and determined what and how much should be produced. In return, 
the communes were obligated to deliver to the government specified 
quantities at predetermined prices. Policymakers had recognized early 
on the inefficiency of the system and concluded that existing price 
policies had created large disincentives in agriculture. To address these 
problems, the central government raised prices for mandatory deliv-
eries and directed greater state investment into agriculture, thereby 
reducing the effective tax rate on agriculture. Simultaneously, and 
more importantly, the central government leadership allowed, even 
if somewhat reluctantly at the beginning, a greater degree of institu-
tional flexibility by permitting the “household responsibility system” 
throughout large areas of the country. Under the household respon-
sibility system, land that had been previously farmed collectively in 
communes was distributed equally to households (adjusting for size of 
household and age of its members) who obtained long-term use-rights 
to the land; households were then responsible for delivering specified 
amounts to the commune and could keep for themselves all additional 
output that they produced. This was effectively the de-collectiviza-
tion of agriculture, a repudiation of the existing institutions in agricul-
ture, and a return to private farming.3 It is important to note that the 
household responsibility system arose at the commune level and not 
at the central government’s initiative. In fact, the central government 
opposed the new institutional arrangement and even as late as 1982 
continued to view the collective as the key to increasing agricultural 
output. In any event, once the household responsibility system became 
established in one part of the country, it quickly spread. There was an 
immediate impact on output and agricultural incomes.
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The spectacular success in agriculture provided important sup-
port for reform in other sectors of the economy. Rising agricultural 
incomes would be spent on consumer goods and the availability of 
these goods had to increase, both by greater domestic production but 
also by imports. Increased domestic production of consumer goods 
also enabled the absorption of the growing labor force. The increased 
domestic output came from the establishment of new private enter-
prises as well as enterprises set up by local governments (“township 
and village enterprises,” or TVEs). The TVEs were the mainspring of 
industrial reform and growth.
The dual-track approach was also adopted for industrial and manu-
factured products. In the pre-reform era, industrial enterprises were 
assigned output and delivery targets, just as was the system in agricul-
ture. Industrial reforms first began on an experimental basis in Sichuan 
Province but quickly spread to other places. The key aspect of these 
reforms is that industrial enterprises were given significant autonomy 
in output and investment decisions but were not privatized (which is 
what had effectively occurred in agriculture). In the mid 1980s, state 
enterprises came to be subject to a “contract responsibility system.” 
Each enterprise signed a contract with the relevant level of government 
(state or central, depending on control) under which the enterprise 
turned over a fixed annual tax and could retain any remaining profits. 
Enterprises were also given the discretion to sell any additional output, 
beyond the planned output, in the open market. These institutional 
changes paralleled the changes in agriculture.
At the time when economic reforms began, state-owned enterprises 
produced about 75 percent of the industrial output in the country 
and employed about 70 percent of all industrial employees. Since then 
the state sector has decreased considerably and now must compete 
with privately owned firms for resources and labor. Many small-sized 
state enterprises have been privatized, although the state has retained 
ownership of the large- and medium-sized firms. State-owned enter-
prises continue to be overstaffed and cannot easily get rid of excess 
workers. Their share of industrial output has fallen more sharply than 
their share of industrial employment.4 Removing barriers to entry by 
domestic and foreign firms has promoted competition and raised pro-
ductivity.
The “special economic zones” provide another application of the 
dual-track approach, even if the strategy of establishing these zones 
was “unbalanced” in the traditional sense in development econom-
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ics. The government knew that these zones had the potential to create 
regional disparities but decided that the receipt of foreign funds and 
technology carried a bigger benefit in the long run. Indeed, the distin-
guished Chinese-American economist Gregory Chow noted that these 
special economic zones also served as experiments for skeptical Party 
members who were wary of foreign investments in China.5 Ultimately, 
these zones were established because they lay outside the plan-track 
and did not affect planned production and allocation, and thereby 
were Pareto-improving. They also came to symbolize the new, open 
direction in China’s economic development. China established four 
special economic zones in Shenzhen, Shantou, Zhuhai in the southern 
province of Guangdong, and Xiamen in Fujian province. The central 
government allowed a great deal of autonomy to the zones, such as the 
approval of foreign investment projects and also in terms of tax rev-
enues generated in these zones. Firms in these zones were free to set 
their own wage and employment conditions and also received favor-
able tax treatment. These economic zones turned out to be very suc-
cessful in attracting foreign investments, and by the late 1990s many 
other such zones had been established.
In the pre-reform era, the Chinese economy was characterized by 
low levels of monetization, not just because of the overall low level 
of economic development but because the economy had essentially 
no capital markets or labor markets or, for that matter, markets for 
intermediate goods such as steel or coal. Central planning, with its 
attendant allocation of inputs, had replaced the market. In such an 
environment, the banking system was state-owned and played a pas-
sive role in resource allocation. There were four large, specialized banks 
in this era: the People’s Bank (which was both the central bank and also 
had commercial bank branches in various cities), the Agricultural Bank 
(which confined its commercial banking functions to the rural areas 
of the country), the Construction Bank (which managed the govern-
ment’s infrastructure construction projects), and the Bank of China 
(which focused on foreign exchange transactions). A little less than a 
decade after economic reforms had begun the government announced 
that China was to develop a complete market system in both labor 
and financial markets. Since then, enormous progress has occurred. 
The Shanghai stock exchange reopened in 1986 after having been shut 
down in 1949. The People’s Bank became China’s central bank in 1983, 
which, after some missteps in the mid-1980s, has matured as an inde-
pendent institution charged with the conduct of monetary policy.
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More than one-half of the total banking assets in China today are 
controlled by four commercial banks, all successors to the special-
ized banks mentioned above. All four have been privatized or are in 
the process of being privatized, and all have minority shares owned 
by U.S., Japanese, and European banks. China’s entry into the World 
Trade Organization in 2001 has necessitated the restructuring of the 
four banks and has opened them up to foreign ownership.
The first phase lasted about fifteen years and saw the old system 
undergo a stunning transformation that changed the incentive struc-
ture and created competition over large segments of the economy. In 
the fall of 1992, Premier Deng Xiaoping undertook his famous “South-
ern Tour” to mobilize support for even greater reform. There has been 
even more profound change, including the formal endorsement by 
the 14th Party Congress in November 1993 of a socialist market econ-
omy as the end goal of transition. In the last decade there has been a 
greater emphasis on the coordination of reform measures; the Party 
has amended the Chinese constitution to put private business on the 
same footing as publicly owned businesses; and the Party has moved 
to create a rule-based market system. All of this has occurred in a one-
party Communist state that has maintained political stability.
II. Lessons from the Chinese Case
Unlike the situation in some other countries (India for instance), there 
was no crisis in China that required reform at that particular time. 
Living standards had grown steadily, if slowly, since the early 1950s 
and there were no acute economic problems. Nonetheless, the politi-
cal leadership turned to reform “because they were seeking to deliver 
more of the rewards of economic growth to the Chinese people in 
order to solidify their political position.”6 After more than twenty-
five years of economic reforms and spectacular growth over the entire 
period, it is clear that the reform process has been robust and steadily 
moving toward greater integration with the world. Scholars will 
debate whether the reform process was choreographed with a long-
term vision of how it should unfold or even if there was a clear sense of 
reform objectives. Yet there can be little doubt that the reform process 
reflected a steady commitment to a market system, even if that was 
couched in phrases such as a “market system with Chinese charac-
teristics.” The early success with changing the reward and incentive 
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structure in agriculture reinforced the institutional change that lay at 
the heart of the Chinese transition.
As far as I can tell, however, China’s reform history evolved piece-
meal in the beginning, with no strong evidence that the reformers had 
already conceptualized in any detail a target system. Instead, the early 
reform measures were intended to address some specific malady in 
the existing economic institutions and incentive structures. Then these 
measures, especially when they resulted in quick successes and when 
they were seen as creating many gainers and few, if any, losers, in 
turn precipitated other reform measures. Inevitably, and not entirely 
unexpectedly, when unanticipated consequences arose the govern-
ment put into place corrective measures. Important reforms, such as 
the establishment of special economic zones or the introduction of the 
household responsibility system in agriculture, were first introduced at 
local levels of government rather than at the central government. They 
rested on a crucial institutional feature of the economic and political 
governance structure that was federalism, Chinese style.7 Numerous 
scholars have noted that the approach to reform reflected a Chinese 
saying meaning “crossing a river by groping the stones.”
The overwhelming evidence from recent decades is that those coun-
tries that have moved up on the scale of economic prosperity have 
been more open to the rest of the world. The rapid growth of exports 
has characterized these successful countries. China is an outstanding 
example. China’s early reforms were incremental, to be sure, but they 
were uniformly directed towards strengthening the “market track” 
while holding the “plan track” on a tight leash. The authorities were 
less inclined to design the “perfect” institution and proceeded with 
making changes to existing institutions incrementally; they were not 
hamstrung by the theory of the “second best” that posits that in an 
economy characterized by many economic distortions, the removal of 
any one distortion will not necessarily improve social welfare. How-
ever, even before the first decade of reform was over, the government 
had a fairly comprehensive view of both the road to reform and the 
target system at the end of the road.
III. Challenges for the Future
China is a unique experiment in modern political economy. The evolu-
tion of its political system has lagged considerably behind its economic 
changes even as its transition to a modern market economy has come 
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a long way. This stands in sharp contrast to the situation in some East-
ern European countries undergoing transition. But a transition is not 
a full event; it is a process. Nonetheless, there can be little doubt that, 
broadly speaking, the country’s economic growth since reforms began 
has completely transformed the lives of its citizens, and its economy 
exhibits many of the features of a modern market economy. The Com-
munist Party of China has certainly taken seriously its social contract 
to improve the lives of the population. Rural China has also undergone 
great transformation; grain output has increased significantly more 
rapidly than the country’s population. There has been an impressive 
reduction in rural poverty. At the beginning of reforms more than 250 
million people lived under the poverty line; this figure has now fallen 
to less than 40 million.
Despite all of these achievements, China’s gross domestic product 
is still about one-ninth of United States’ GDP. To provide some per-
spective on this comparative number, it is interesting to note that, in 
1950, Germany’s GDP was about one-fifth of U.S. GDP and Japan’s 
GDP was one-eighth of U.S. GDP.8 China was admitted to the World 
Trade Organization in 2001 after nearly a decade of preparation. Its 
tariffs and non-tariff barriers have come down considerably and the 
domestic prices of traded goods have moved gradually closer to world 
levels. The ratio of total trade to total output is now about 40 percent 
and China is more fully integrated into the world economy than ever 
before. However, the national average figure described above masks 
rather large differences in openness and trade orientation across prov-
inces. The southern and eastern provinces are far more open, have 
received the bulk of foreign investments, and have prospered more as 
compared to the northwest and southwest provinces.
China’s early reformers and its current leadership are still feeling 
their way, as they must, continuously adjusting and tweaking their 
pathway to a complete market-based system. Even if China is a special 
case—and in many ways it is special by virtue of its sheer size and its 
economic structure when it actually embarked on the path to reform—
there are lessons to be drawn from its relatively successful evolution.
There is growing concern about income and wealth inequalities 
within urban areas, between urban and rural areas, and between the 
southern and coastal provinces (where a great deal of modernization 
has occurred) and the relatively less developed western and northern 
provinces. The Gini coefficient for China is estimated at about 0.42, 
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which is approximately in the middle of Gini values for countries at 
about the same level of real per capita income.9 Even so, for purposes 
of internal political stability, the growing inequality has received atten-
tion at the highest levels of government. The government is investing 
more in the poorer areas and also in people in those areas, to enable 
them to make the transition to market-oriented labor markets.
Housing wealth is a major component of total wealth in urban 
China. There is some evidence that there is a housing bubble in the 
major urban areas. The government has moved in recent months to 
curb speculation in housing prices: it has raised the down payment 
requirements to 30 percent (from 20 percent) for apartments exceeding 
90 square meters and it has raised the transactions tax on apartments 
that are sold within five years of purchase.
As noted above, an exciting transition is underway in China both 
in economic terms and in its political makeup. Everyone interested in 
world affairs should watch it with great interest. •
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